Our model presents analytical results and sensitivity analyses – through a simulation exercise – of different parameters to study the maximum size of stable coalitions and the benefits of collaboration between these coalitions. Our choice of models was motivated by the need for a more general understanding of the driving forces behind coalition stability and the impact on the potential for effective agreements. Another desirable contribution to the model would be to improve its empirical relevance by integrating actual data into the theoretical framework, as others have done before (Winands et al. 2013). Setting the numerical exercise model with empirical data would shed more light on the political implications of forming a coalition in the context of biodiversity. If we include the double-sided asymmetry in the three-feature model, the largest stable coalition remains for the range of parameters considered (with the exception of the modification of , (alpha)) equal to the symmetrical model: . (s) – 2.). The difference lies in the composition of stable coalitions. Stable coalitions are made up of high-yield, low-maintenance countries (Bc type). We also note that, as in the symmetrical case, cooperation between countries is positively linked to the increase in the number of alphas. In general, stability may be lower and the instability of large coalitions may indicate that several partial agreements – made up of countries of the same type – could be more effective in terms of conservation outcomes than a single international agreement.

Countries with significant biodiversity conservation benefits and high costs for biodiversity conservation (short for BCC), programmes based on thematic objectives have been put in place (for example. B forest biodiversity and mountain biodiversity) as well as programmes with cross-sector objectives (such as protected area development, environmental communication and education and public relations). Developed countries provide funds for their respective bilateral development programmes, as well as funds to the Global Environment Fund (GEF). Eligible landowners in three separate regions are invited to enter into conservation agreements with annual payments. Winands, S., Holm-Muller, K., Weikard, H.-P. (2013). The game of biodiversity protection with heterogeneous countries. Ecological economy, 89, 14-23. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.01.013. The OCT has developed a Metric assessment, reviewed by experts, to identify the best performance areas in Conservation Management Program tenders, fixed-price offers and revolving fund purchases. The Metric Assessment assesses the cost-effectiveness of BCT`s investments in the various private soil protection agreements.

The level of conservation q i represents the total number of species conserved in the country i. Global Biodiversity Conservation G describes how the aggregated conservation species is established in species protection. G must be less than or equal to the sum of each level of preservation (G, Q-sum q_. In this context, the overall preservation of G biodiversity is a sub-additive function of the sum of the conservation levels of all countries, z.B. Q – sum q_.