Nadiya Savchenko and Oleg Sentsov.  Precisely because Minsk-2 reflects this stalemate on the battlefield, it is an inherently contradictory document. As mentioned earlier, the agreement conditions the return of the border to Ukrainian control on a political solution that Russia and its proxies accept. However, it also contains provisions that promote the restoration of Ukrainian control over the Donbass before an agreement is reached. Articles 1 and 2 provide for a permanent ceasefire and the removal of heavy weapons from the line of contact before a dialogue on the elections takes place. Article 4 does not specify whether the dialogue should begin the day after the withdrawal begins or the day after it is concluded; Ukraine can credibly argue that the withdrawal of heavy weapons must be completed before the start of electoral preparations. Most importantly, Russia has not yet withdrawn its troops, equipment, and irregulars from Ukraine, as Article 10 effectively requires it to act without preconditions – thus relinquishing border control.63 Russia has now strengthened the armed formations of the DNR/NRL and strengthened its control over them, so that they are now effectively appendages of its own army.64 Taken together, These circumstances make it impossible to hold elections in Donbass in accordance with osce/odihr standards set out in Article 12. The document is signed by the members of a trilateral contact group: the agreement was prepared by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE.  The group was established in June to facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Meetings of the group were held with informal representatives of the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People`s Republics on 31 July, 26 August, 1 September and 5 September 2014. The details of the agreement signed on 5 September 2014 were largely similar to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko`s “fifteen-point peace plan” of 20 June. The following representatives signed the document: This means that the focus should not be on the details of the agreements themselves, but on what will change Russia`s calculation. The impossible to win, the high economic and military costs, the improvement of the Ukrainian defense forces – all this can influence Russia`s decisions to end the war or further intensify it with the overwhelming military force it has deployed in Ukraine and on its borders. Today, Russia expects to have all the cards. The West must convince Russia that it is wrong. 6. Ukraine has implemented as much Minsk as possible while Russia still occupies its territory. The agreements require political action on the part of Ukraine, including special status for the region, amnesty for those who committed crimes in the context of the conflict, local elections and some form of decentralization under the Ukrainian constitution. But the form of these measures is not specified, and Ukraine has already adopted laws that deal with all points. It has passed laws on special status and amnesty – and expanded them with renewals – and already has legislation on local elections.
It has adopted constitutional amendments. The Minsk agreements do not oblige Ukraine to grant autonomy to Donbass or to become a federalized state. It is Russia`s unique interpretation that the measures adopted by Ukraine are somehow inadequate, although the agreements do not specify what details should be included, and Ukraine has already complied with what is actually specified to the extent possible. However, despite their shortcomings, the Minsk agreements are essential to the current diplomatic process around Ukraine for two reasons: first, it is the most recent official and written document to which Russia has acceded and which reaffirms Ukraine`s sovereignty and territorial integrity; second, Russia`s inability to implement the agreement is the basis for maintaining EU sanctions against Russia. These sanctions must be maintained and strengthened if there is any hope of convincing Russia to end the war. The implications for Ukrainian foreign policy would be far-reaching. A neutrality clause in the constitution would prevent NATO membership.56 Nevertheless, the DNR and the NRL would be able to establish agreements with other countries (i.e. Russia), perhaps Russian military bases on their territories.57 New doubts would also concern European integration. Acceptance of Russia`s demands could weaken the central authorities in Kiev to such an extent that the implementation of the Federal Foreign Office would be impossible. Immediately, no later than 30 days after the signing of this document, to adopt a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine indicating a territory subject to the special arrangement in accordance with the law of Ukraine “By temporary order of the local government in certain regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, on the basis of the line established in a Minsk Memorandum of 19 September, 2014 In the midst of a sharp decline in violence, following an agreement to resume the implementation of Minsk II, concluded on 1 November 2014.
The Four met in Normandy on 2 October. At the meeting, it was agreed that elections in the conflict zone would be held in accordance with Minsk II.  To achieve this, French President François Hollande said the elections should be postponed to 2016 because it would take three months to prepare for them.  Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to use his influence to prevent the DPR and LPR from holding early elections.  As a result, the DPR and the LPR announced on October 6 that their scheduled elections had been postponed to February 21, 2016.  Local elections were held in the rest of Ukraine on October 25, 2015. After the postponement, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that if OSCE observers verified that the planned elections in the separatist zones were in accordance with Ukrainian law and Minsk II, the “special status law” for these areas would enter into force immediately.  Nine of the 13 points of the agreement concern conflict management: a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact (Articles 1 to 3); an amnesty for those involved in the fighting (Article 5); the exchange of hostages and illegally detained persons (Article 6); humanitarian aid (Article 7); the resumption of socio-economic ties between Ukraine and occupied Donbass (Article 8); the withdrawal of “all foreign armed formations, military equipment and also mercenaries” from Ukraine and the disarmament of “all illegal groups” (Article 10); and the activities of the TCG (Article 13). – the possibility for the central executive authorities to conclude agreements with the competent local authorities on the economic, social and cultural development of the different regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; The Protocol on the Results of the Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, commonly known as the Minsk Protocol, is an agreement to end the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine, signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of that country, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People`s Republic (DPR), the Luhansk People`s Republic (LPR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).    It was signed under the auspices of the OSCE after lengthy discussions in Minsk, Belarus.
The agreement, which followed several previous attempts to end fighting in Donbass, introduced an immediate ceasefire. It failed to stop the fighting in Donbass, and a new package of measures called Minsk II followed, which was agreed on 12 February 2015.  Again, this could not end the fighting, but the Minsk agreements remain the basis for any future solution to the conflict, as agreed at the Normandy format meeting. 9. Restoration of full control of the border of Ukraine by the Government of Ukraine throughout the conflict zone, which should begin on the first day after the local elections and be completed after a comprehensive political settlement (municipal elections in individual areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of Ukrainian law), and constitutional reform) by the end of 2015, subject to the implementation of paragraph 11 – with consultations and within the framework of the Agreement with representatives of the different regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. 1. There are two Minsk agreements, not just one. The first “Minsk Protocol” was signed on 5 September 2014. This is mainly the commitment to a ceasefire along the existing line of contact, which Russia has never respected. By February 2015, fighting had intensified to a level that led to further calls for a ceasefire and eventually led to the second Minsk agreement, signed on 12 February 2015. .